This paper presents an overview of an interview study carried out in the Republic of Ireland approximately one year after the introduction of the euro in January 2002, and also compares the Irish experience to that of the other initial Eurozone countries. The new currency seems to have been rather more positively received in Ireland than elsewhere. Irish adults had a generally more positive attitude towards the new currency and seemed to have adapted to it rather well. Nevertheless, they shared some common experiences and problems with citizens of other countries, such as the perception that the introduction of the euro raised inflation more than it actually did, confusion of notes and coins, and the use of coping strategies involving price conversion to the former currency. The implications of the Irish experience for policy are discussed.
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Euro Stories: The Irish Experience of a Change of Currency
The focus of this paper is the Irish citizen's experience of the euro before and after its introduction in January 2002. Historically, the UK and Ireland shared the same currency until the independent Irish punt was established in 1979, although specifically Irish notes and coins had been introduced much earlier, in 1928. The Irish case is especially interesting because, of the 12 initial "Eurozone" countries, the Irish punt (IRP) was the only currency that had a unit value greater than the euro and it was the currency unit closest to it (1 IRP = €1.27).
The first part of the paper presents an overview of the results of an interview study conducted in Ireland (see Ranyard, Burgoyne, Saldanha, & Routh, 2005; Ranyard, Routh, Burgoyne, & Saldanha, 2007, for details) , which aimed for an in-depth exploration of perceptions, feelings and experiences, and how these might have changed during the first year of adaptation to the euro. The broad aim of qualitative enquiry such as this is to elucidate 'the meaning of experience, actions and events as they are interpreted through the eyes of particular participants, researchers and (sub)cultures and …. the complexities of behaviour and meaning in the contexts in which they typically … occur' (Henwood, 1996, p. 27) . As well as being interesting in its own right, interview evidence on currency adaptation is important in the cross-validation and triangulation of findings from surveys and experiments such as those conducted by Del , Hoffman, Kirchler and Kamleitner (2007) and Marques and Dehaene (2004) .
In order to place the present interview findings in a broader context, the second part of the paper relates the Irish citizen's experience of the euro to that of citizens of other European countries. To this end, key Eurobarometer survey questions indicating the degree of adaptation to the new currency are examined. Specifically, Irish responses one and two years after the euro changeover are compared to those from Italy, Austria and Portugal. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for policy of this interview and survey evidence.
The Interview Study
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 24 Irish adults from the Dublin area varying in age (18 to 75 years), level of education (from minimum schooling to degree Euro Stories 4 level or higher) and gender. The interviews were carried out approximately one year after the introduction of the euro, from October 2002 to February 2003, and covered respondents' experiences from the period just before the euro's introduction. The interview schedule was designed to address four aspects of adaptation to the euro: (1) attitudes and feelings towards different aspects of the transition; (2) evaluations of prices in euros together with perceptions and beliefs concerning price rises; (3) mistakes, slips and lapses in economic transactions in the new currency; and (4) experience of relearning prices and strategies of adaptation, including the role of currency conversion. For (3) above respondents were asked whether, since the introduction of the euro, they had made certain specific mistakes more or less than before, and whether they could recall specific examples. Fourteen questions, adapted from the Absent Mindedness with Money scale Burgoyne, 1989, 1990) , were posed in a fixed random order. Details of the qualitative analyses of the responses are presented in the primary reports referred to earlier.
Attitudes and Feelings
Surveys prior to the euro's introduction found that support for it varied widely from one country to another, and had increased to 66% overall by 1999 (Ahrendt, 1999) . In Ireland Lambkin (2001) found that in 1997 the public were generally positive about the proposed euro. A Eurobarometer survey after the euro changeover, in September 2002, reported that 77% of Irish respondents were very or quite happy that the euro had become their currency, compared to the average of the Eurozone countries of 53% (European Commission, 2002a) . The interview study elicited further details of how people felt about the punt, the euro and the changeover.
Prior to the transition some respondents explained how for them the punt had been a symbol of Irish identity. This is in line with an earlier study of Irish attitudes to the euro (Lambkin, 2001 ) and studies of other currencies (Helleiner, 1998; Pepermans, Burgoyne, & Müller-Peters, 1998) . However, the majority of participants did not express such cultural associations and if anything, were rather indifferent to the fate of the punt. At the time of interview, only a few respondents expressed regret that the punt had been consigned to history.
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Ireland's decision to adopt the euro marked an important change in the country's international position, bringing it closer to continental Europe and establishing some distance from Britain. Most of the interview respondents saw this in a positive light, both prior to 2002 and at the time of interview. Also, there were signs in some responses that the euro was playing a role in strengthening European identity, with some respondents expressing this quite clearly ("we're all Europeans now"). Overall, however, the explanations respondents gave for their feelings about the transition tended not to mention the symbolic meanings of currencies. This is in contrast to studies of other countries that changed to the euro, such as Austria (Meier & Kirchler, 2003) , that have found the symbolic aspects of the former national currencies to be rather salient. We found, however, that Irish respondents focussed on economic factors and pragmatic aspects of everyday financial transactions. For example, experience of using the euro in other countries was often mentioned as one of the practical advantages, and some respondents remarked how quickly they had started to "think in euros". On the other hand, perceived price rises, the slide in the euro's international value, difficulties with notes and coins and with keeping track of spending, all contributed to continuing negative attitudes for some respondents.
Euro Price Evaluation
As discussed in other papers in this special issue Gamble, 2007) , the euro illusion is a phenomenon related to the money illusion (Shafir et al., 1997) . Due to differences in nominal values of currencies, the same goods or services will be rated as less expensive when the money unit is larger. Extending earlier work on the euro illusion (Gamble et al., 2002) , the interview study considered whether prices in euros were experienced initially as higher than the equivalent price in punts, and if so, whether this perception persisted. The aim was to distinguish any euro illusion effects from the tendency for people to believe that currency change in itself causes price inflation.
When asked about their initial perception of prices or income, respondents' replies reflected clear evidence of illusory increases. The majority found that amounts expressed in euro seemed much higher initially, simply because of the higher nominal values. At the time of interview, however, no-one felt that euro amounts were Euro Stories 6 subjectively higher because of the higher numbers involved and illusory increases seemed to have disappeared. This is consistent with the findings of Del who found no evidence for a euro illusion in Ireland in the third year of the euro, whereas it still persisted in Italy.
Although not experiencing an illusion based on the nominal value of the new currency, Irish respondents at the time of interview nevertheless tended to insist that prices had actually risen in the months following the introduction of the euro. The majority of respondents believed that prices had clearly increased around the time of the transition. Some attributed this to inflationary pressures generally, not specifically associated with the euro, but there was a general suspicion that some of the price increases at the time could be attributed to the changeover. One view was that some businesses had timed price increases to coincide with the euro in order to hide them, and another was that some traders had rounded up rather than down. At the time of interview, most respondents were still convinced that prices were higher than before the introduction of the euro.
The above concerns were reflected in the Irish media. On January 19 th , the Irish Independent (2002) listed "price hikes" in everything from cell phones to visits to the Doctor, saying "Welcome to rip-off Ireland." Concern was so great that the Minister for Consumer Affairs commissioned a survey to establish whether this was really the case.
This report (Forfás, 2002) concluded that there had not been profiteering on any grand scale. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, consumer price inflation had not been out of line with the same period in previous years, though there had been "unusual" price rises in certain sectors, such as health and other non-traded goods or services where competition was weak. Despite such evidence to the contrary, beliefs that price increases followed the euro changeover were widely held across the Eurozone. The
Eurobarometer survey around the same time as the present study found that 82% of Eurozone respondents believed that the change to the euro had been "rather to the detriment of consumers" (European Commission, 2002a) . Furthermore, other studies found that perceived inflation and actual inflation began to diverge in all Eurozone countries after the introduction of the euro and that these gaps persisted for some years (Aucremanne et al., 2005) . It is interesting to note also that surveys prior to the Euro Stories 7 changeover found a widespread expectation that the euro would lead to higher inflation (for further discussion see Traut-Mattausch et al., 2007; .
Difficulties and Errors in Everyday Financial Transactions
With respect to initial difficulties, Kühberger and Keul (2003) people are prone to make slips and errors in their everyday financial transactions (Routh & Burgoyne, 1989 , 1990 . Such slips and lapses had not previously been investigated in the context of a period of adaptation to currency change when the potential for errors is likely to be greater. Thus, the present interview study aimed to identify the kinds of errors and difficulties in everyday financial transactions that Irish people experienced following the change to the euro. The hope was to be able to distinguish between routine errors in financial transactions and those that could be attributed to the change of currency.
At the time of interview, about one year after the transition, problems in dealing with notes and coins were still being experienced by at least some of the respondents.
Confusing notes and coins was the most frequently reported type of error, and dealing with all the small change was generally seen as a headache. It should also be noted that two years after the euro changeover the percentage of people in Ireland who reported difficulties in distinguishing and manipulating coins was the highest in the Eurozone (42% compared to the average of 28%).
Other relatively prevalent types of error related to monitoring personal money.
Most respondents reported errors in keeping track of their everyday spending money, as has been found in previous research (Routh & Burgoyne, 1989 , 1990 . At least some of these could be attributable to the problem of dealing with a new currency, for example, taking less money out of the bank, or finding that money disappeared more quickly than before. These can be explained as instances of habitual behaviour based on the nominal Euro Stories 8 value of the punt being erroneously continued in the new context. People momentarily forgot that they were in the new euro-era and seemed to be accidentally "thinking in punts." Although there have been no similar studies elsewhere in the Eurozone, this type of error would be different in other countries because their main currency units were smaller than the euro (e.g. taking too much money out of the bank rather than too little).
Currency Adaptation Strategies
Previous research has explored currency adaptation strategies in general and the specific processes of mental currency conversion and price relearning in a new currency (Burgoyne et al., 1999; Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2001; Marques & Dehaene, 2004 ; see also Lemaire, 2007) . The aim in this regard was to explore Irish people's experiences of relearning prices and adaptation over an extended time span, especially the role of currency conversion. The study investigated the strategies Irish people used to adapt to the euro, including the role of currency conversion and price relearning. It also explored the changes that took place in strategies of adaptation during the first year.
The changing role of currency conversion was the clearest indicator of the process of adaptation to the euro. Initially nearly all respondents routinely used mental arithmetic or their euro converter to compare prices, either to check whether a price had gone up or to evaluate it relative to a familiar scale. Quite quickly, however, euro converters fell out of use and mental arithmetic comparisons became selective. In general, selective comparison was used when prices were high in absolute value, for example, house prices or annual salaries, and when prices were perceived as unexpectedly higher, such as an expensive drink in a bar. At the time of interview there were wide individual differences in this, from some who claimed to never compare euros to punts and to be thinking completely in euros, to others who said they still routinely compared and were still thinking in punts. The above pattern of conversion strategy use is consistent with survey findings 11 months after the euro's introduction, discussed in the next section.
Another important aspect of adaptation is the learning of prices in euro. Most respondents had learned euro prices for at least some of their regular purchases by the time of interview. The majority, though, felt that they knew the price of a significantly Marques, 2007) . Also, in both countries accuracy was significantly better for frequently purchased items compared to those purchased less frequently.
It is interesting to compare our findings of Irish people's experience of conversion of prices to the former currency and learning prices in the new currency with those of Hoffman et al. (2007) who investigated the Austrian case. These authors interpreted their survey evidence in terms of four strategies of adaptation, which differed in the extent to which they referred back to the former currency when considering euro amounts. In the conversion strategy, the euro value is converted to the former currency either by precise calculation or approximately. We described earlier how our Irish respondents used this strategy. In the marker value strategy, the former currency value of a few euro amounts is learned and the former currency value of amounts in between these markers is estimated. Some of Hoffman et al.'s survey respondents reported using this strategy, which they interpret as part of a process of learning to rescale the whole money value system to the euro. However, no interview responses could be clearly 
Adaptation to the Euro in Ireland Compared to Other Countries
On the whole the Irish respondents seemed to have adapted rather easily to the new currency. In order to more fully substantiate this, it is useful to compare Ireland with other European countries, such as Portugal, Austria and Italy, on some measures of adaptation used in the Eurobarometer survey. Two questions are particularly relevant measures, with the second being in two parts (European Commission, 2002a , 2002b :
It is one year (two years) since we have been using the euro instead of (NATIONAL CURRENCY). Today, would you say that the euro continues to cause you a lot of difficulty, some difficulty or no difficulty at all? Figure 1 shows that two years after the introduction to the euro about half of respondents reported a lot of, or some difficulty, although this was somewhat lower for the younger respondents (question 1 above). Figure 2 shows the overall Eurozone percentages of respondents of different ages who said they counted most often in euro (clearly, a measure of adaptation to the euro). It shows that two years after the introduction of the euro Eurozone citizens still had some way to go before they could be said to be fully adapted. Nevertheless, progress can be seen in all age groups during the second year, particularly in the younger respondents and with respect to exceptional purchases.
-----------Insert Figs. 1 and 2 about here ----------
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Responses to these questions indicate wide differences in adaptation across countries in the first two years after the euro changeover. As Figure 3 shows, the proportion of Irish respondents reporting that the euro continued to cause difficulties as much lower than in the other three countries. Figure 4 compares percentages of respondents claiming to count in euro by country. As may be seen, for common purchases a large majority of Irish respondents reported counting most often in euro nearly one year after its introduction, rising to nearly 90% after two years. In contrast, the corresponding percentages were below 50% for Austrian, Portuguese and Italian respondents after one year. For the Austrians a large increase can be seen in the second year, whereas for Portuguese and Italian respondents it actually fell in the second year.
Turning to exceptional items, the percentages of respondents who reported 
Discussion and Policy Implications
It was found that Irish adults had a generally positive attitude towards the new currency and seem to have adapted to it rather well. Furthermore, Eurobarometer and other comparisons showed that Irish adaptation was faster than elsewhere. There are a several possible factors that might contribute to explaining this. One, mentioned at the beginning, is the closeness between the new and the old currency scales (1 IRP = €1.27). If this were a major factor, then countries with a similar exchange rate, such as the UK, would have a similar experience to the Irish if they adopt the euro. A second factor might be age, since as was found, there is evidence that younger people adapted better, and the average age of the Irish population is lower than others in the Eurozone.
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However, policy makers wishing to facilitate a currency transition can do nothing about this or other demographic factors. On the other hand, they could steer policy to take into account some other possible factors. First, the initial and continuing generally positive attitude to adopting the euro in Ireland may have contributed to smooth adaptation, as might the relatively rapid reduction in the use of conversion to the former currency as a coping strategy. While the latter is likely to be a consequence of adaptation, the continued prevalent and persistent use of conversion found in countries such as Italy may be a barrier to learning euro values. This has implications for policy matters such as dual pricing: how long should it continue after a changeover?
It was also found that Irish citizens shared some common experiences and problems with citizens of other countries, including the initial use of coping strategies involving price conversion to the former currency, confusion of notes and coins, and the perception that the introduction of the euro raised inflation more than it actually did.
These too have policy implications. With respect to the second of these experiences, a basic, short-term learning process is obviously necessary, involving recognition of, and discrimination between, specific notes and coins. However, problems may have continued because of certain aspects of the design of euro notes and coins. In particular, the physical differences between some euro notes and euro coins may not be sufficient to enable the kind of rapid recognition and discrimination necessary for an efficient currency system. Irish people may have experienced greater difficulties with notes and coins because their former currency made much greater use in their design of physical differences, especially size (Bruce et al., 1983) . Perhaps such aspects had not been sufficiently heeded in the euro coin design process. Finally, with respect to the third common issue mentioned above, perceptions and expectations of higher inflation following a currency change are clearly deep-seated and policy makers need to anticipate this. Steps need to be taken, both to protect consumers against unjustified price increases at a time of uncertainty, and to retain their trust.
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